

CIPE

Cuadernos del

AN INCLUSIVE MAP OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORIES AND AUTHORS

FLORENT FRASSON-QUENOZ

N.º 21, JUNIO DE 2014

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Los Cuadernos de trabajo del Centro de Investigaciones y Proyectos Especiales, CIPE, de la Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales, son una contribución a la investigación, al desarrollo del conocimiento, a los debates con especial significado y alcance en las políticas públicas, las finanzas, la economía y las relaciones internacionales. En los Cuadernos se expresan los avances de las líneas y los grupos de investigación del CIPE y, por tanto, son una muestra de los procesos académicos e intelectuales que adelantan profesores, investigadores y estudiantes de la Universidad Externado de Colombia. El CIPE tiene tres grupos de investigación reconocidos por *COLCIENCIAS*: Observatorio de Análisis de los Sistemas Internacionales, OASIS; Observatorio de Políticas, Ejecución y Resultados de la Administración Pública, OPERA; Observatorio de Economía y Operaciones Numéricas, ODEON.

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AN INCLUSIVE MAP OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND AUTHORS

Florent Frasson-Quenoz

Externado de Colombia University
Working Paper

“The History of science is always richer than its rational reconstruction”
Lakatos, 1971, p. 104


INTRODUCTION

One of the main obstacles when one tries to explain what it means to understand the world with analytical tools is the absence of an inclusive chart that presents the similarities and differences between one theory and the other.

In this paper I will try to explain what this chart could look like, and position the main authors and theories of International Relations on it.

My intellectual questioning started when I read a 2009 paper by Ole Waever on Kenneth Waltz, in which he presented Waltz’s theory of theory. In this very same paper Waltz explains how the construction of an intellectual representation is an indispensable first step in the direction of creating a new theory. Following this advice, and remembering my younger days when I was trying to understand the

concept of political right and left, I started building a conceptual map of International Relations Theories (IRT).




Panorama.it, 15/06/2009

Unfortunately, IR theorizing is not a two-dimensional phenomenon and a representation inspired from the semicircular right and left divide could not render its complexity. Alexander Wendt’s mapping of IRT (2006, p. 29) was considering two dimensions of IRT from an ontological standpoint. This particular map was a very good starting point but, as I experimented with my students, using this particular map


in order to explain ontological contending points of view was more than challenging. As I was trying to use Wendt's map to explain the different theories and contending paradigms, I had to admit that IR theorizing is not only multidimensional ontologically but also epistemologically. When in 1997 Emanuel Adler argued that constructivism was in fact situated at the crossroads of all IRT he used Wendt's map and "simply" located constructivism in the middle of it.

Alexander Wendt's map of IRT



(2006, p. 29)

Emanuel Adler's map of IRT



(1997, p. 331)

Both Wendt's and Adler's map of IRT were somehow disturbing for my students. Such questions as "How neorealism can be both -and at the same time- holist and individualist?", "Is not the English School materialist more than idealist?" or "Is not the English School at the crossroads of all theories and not constructivism?" were questions that needed a long and detailed response.

Those questions were sufficient to justify a new investigative problem: How could the major theories of International Relations be represented on a single map?

The three variables I consider important in order to draw this map are: the grade of confidence in relation to the possibility of change, the analytical referent and the philosophical inclination of the different authors. In the firsts pages of this paper I will explain those variables and then I will try to explain how the main thinkers and tendencies of IRT can be located on the map.

HOW TO REPRESENT THREE VARIABLES ON A TWO-DIMENSIONAL MAP?

One of the first and most important difficulties one faces when one tries to think the variety and multidimensionality of IRT is the fact that International Relations is not considered by all its students as a science per se. This problem is not particular to our discipline but a concern for all social sciences. It is true that the inquiry process in our branch of knowledge pro-

duction does not correspond to the canons of heuristics as stated by George Pólaya in 1957: First understand the problem faced, second establish a plan to solve it, third implement the plan and, fourth, confirm the solution.

This very same problem about “what is scientific?” is at the root of the second interparadigmatical –or great-debate in IR (Kaplan, 1966). The fact of the matter is that some scholars of IR were so profoundly unsettled by this question that they were drawn to reformulate their theories in order to make them more “scientific” (neorealism and neoliberalism). Here, “more “scientific”” would mean a science constructed on a materialistic base and a systematic problem solving approach. Nevertheless, as John Mearsheimer stated, his scientific theory of IR “only gets it right 75% of the time” (2013), far from the 100% IR scholars seek. Phrased simply, in spite of their best efforts IR scholars have not been able to gain the recognition they are looking for. My bottom line here is that methods are one of the variables one has to consider if one is to represent accurately the variety of IRT.

But the methods chosen to lead an inquiry are fundamentally linked to the methodological standpoint a researcher adopts (Jackson, 2011, p. 30). Since the behavioral charge against the proto-scientific construction of knowledge in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, two methodological conceptions are in contention: an explicative or rationalist/positivist conception and a comprehensive or reflectivist/reflexivist one (Kehoane, 1998).

Following the first conception, it would be possible to give a comparable explanation to IR phenomena as “exact scientists” do of natural phenomena: objective causes that exist independently from the conscientiousness of actors, always produce the same effects. Following the second one, it would be impossible to produce explanations because the researcher is always considered a part of the problem he is observing. For reflexivists only the interpretation – not explanation - of facts is possible.

What could be viewed as a peculiar characteristic of the IRT, the division between positivist and reflexivist, is not. In fact, this schism is an expression of a much deeper philosophical divide. Since the beginning of recorded occidental philosophical thought a division between dualism (Plato) and monism (Thales or Heraclitus) persist and this divide has irrigated debates in all sciences, not only social ones.

If we reflect on the debate in theoretical physics about the existence of “time”, the parallels we can draw with social sciences are illustrative. When physicists try to give an answer to the simple question “Does time exist?” the variety of responses is striking. Lee Smolin (2013) explains that time can be measured because it is created through the relations between material elements in the universe. Sean Carroll (2010) defends the idea that “time” is a dimension more of the reality we live in and that all moments in time are equally real, consequently that all moments in

time exist simultaneously. In 2001, Julian Barbour argued that if materiality was real, “time” was an illusion created by human minds. In his view, just as a movie is a succession of images, time is a succession of slices of matter. But for others (Mauldin, 2010), the reality of “time” is simple common sense so there is no time to waste speculating about its reality.

This example shows that social scientists are not the only ones wondering about such fundamental questions as: What is a problem? What is the problem to study? How can we bring a solution to a problem? What is the solution to a problem?

My argument here is that IRT are as diverse as any other theories of any other science and that the fact that some IR theorists reject the views of others is not sufficient proof to state that one particular stream of thought could be presented as the exclusive representative of the theoretical thought in IR.

So the first variable I want to detail is the philosophical inclination of the researcher. The most important divide between IR theorists is salient when we consider the response they give to the question: “Is reality existing independently from the observer?”

Some theorists will argue that reality exists independently others will argue the contrary. Depending on the response they will give their explanation/interpretation of what is happening in the world will be drastically different. The formers will base their thinking on materialistic con-

siderations, such as rationality –materially defined- and utilitarianism (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 39). The latter are drawing on social relativity of reality and consequently are magnifying the importance of the revolving logic of agents and the importance of values (Onuf, 2013).

Those considerations steer the attention of theorists on particular sectors of the human activity. Military issues and economics are more studied by positivists and networks and ethics are more studied by reflexivists. Usually, realists and liberals are presented as positivists and constructivists and critical theorists as reflexivists.

A direct consequence of the philosophical option taken by theorists is that their attention is drawn to a particular analytical referent – second variable considered.

Positivists are prone to reduce their analysis of international relations -the global set of interactions- to what is considered as existing in international politics, the state and the anarchical nature of their interactions. Historically, realists and liberals were lead to focus on state relations. Using the same basic assumption that reality is materially defined, they were considering the connections between those actors as founded on their will to dominate territories and the possibility of cooperation on a competitive scene (Morgenthau, 2005; Carr, 1940 and Wilson).

Nevertheless, through a series of debates (third debate) the focus of theorists was gradually widened. States and the system of states ceased to be the sole analyti-

cal referent and the scope of inquiry was opened to non-state actors and, in some cases, to individuals. Since the late 1950's, liberals started to consider the autonomy of international institutions (Hass, 1958, 1964; Mitrany, 1965), the relevance of private actors such as multinationals in an interdependent configuration (Keohane y Nye, 1977) and finally the impact of individual behavior on international relations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Maoz & Gat, 2001).

In order to represent this multiplication of analytical referent I have chosen to divide the horizontal axis of the map in four different spaces, each one representing a different analytical referent. From left to right: System or society of states, states, group of individuals and individuals.

The first referent bears two distinctive names because depending on the theorists considered some will use the term system and others the term society. Each of those terms focuses the attention on the same level of analysis (Boulding, 1956; McClelland, 1966; Singer, 1961), but the term system brings to mind a mechanical functioning of human relations moved by material forces and the term society evokes materially based human relations regulated by norms. Essentially this distinction is made in order to differentiate between the postures realists and liberals adopt when they implement their theoretical tools.


On the other hand of the same axis, from right to left, the same four divisions are made: Humanity, Social structures,

Group of individuals and Individuals. Those referents are echoing the first four. But the philosophical standpoint from which reflexivist theorists are observing the world leads us to change the vocabulary. The term humanity is used to highlight the importance of the global level of analysis considered but, at the same time, the term suggests the existence of a common destiny shared between highly disparate individuals and group of individuals. In the same fashion, the term "state" and the terms "social structures" echo one another. When positivists use the term state it is because they are studying one specific social structure but, unlike reflexivists, they do not feel the need to study any other social structure because they assume that these do not have the same relevance in the explanation. Finally, when positivists and reflexivists use the two referent "group of individuals" and "individuals" they do not do it in the same way. The first group accentuate the material determination of behavior, the second group put emphasis on the relevance of identity and values.

The third and last variable is the least problematic of the three: the grade of confidence *vis a vis* change. Every theory postulates that the pattern of behavior can or cannot change. This confidence in the possibility of change depends on the basic assumptions stated. Depending on the theory or theorist considered the grade of confidence varies. In order to translate this variation I propose a division in four different degrees –top-down-: change

HOW TO PLACE THE DIFFERENT THEORIES AND AUTHORS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON THE MAP?

REALISM



The main characteristic of realist thinkers is that we can locate them on a much reduced space on the map. This particularity can be explained by the fact that realists rely on a limited number of hypothesis (materialist rationality, centrality of state, international anarchy and utilitarianism). Consequently, realists only consider two possible analytical referents: state and international system. The interpenetration of the different streams of realist thinking is explained by this fact.

Morgenthau (2005) and Grieco (1993) are theorists who focus on the state -its behavior- and what they consider to be the appropriate way for states to handle themselves. For those two authors, the

Balance of Power can last long enough to allow a change in the way states relate to each other (from permanent conflict and war to relative peace). In the same way, Schweller (1996) and Zakaria (1998) study states and put the emphasis on the pluridimensionality of state relations (politics, economics, legal and moral). Nevertheless, the conclusions they draw from those considerations are much more pessimistic than Morgenthau's and Grieco's. In their view, the repetition of history (endless repetition of wars) is inevitable.


On their part, Waltz (1979) and Gilpin (1981) are working on the basic hypothesis that the nature of the international system (anarchy) determines states'

behavior. Following this premise, states are less important than the structure *in se* in order to explain international realities. Nonetheless, states' rationality and utilitarianism lead them to minimize the cost of the completion of their goal –survival. Following this trend of thinking, states are only prompt to initiate a costly war if they think that the status quo no longer serves them well enough. In this configuration, in spite of the anarchical nature of the international system and in spite of the permanent uncertainty states of relative peace –stalemates- can be attained. In their view, bi- or unipolarity can reduce the probability of war. Mearsheimer (2001) and Walt (1985), building on the same premises are drawn to conclude that the phenomenon of war is not only inevitable but also, most of the time, necessary if the state is to complete its objective.

The distinction between offensive and defensive realism was first pinned by Jack Snyder in 1991. The offense-defense reflection stems from the conclusions realist thinkers make about the influence of the Security Dilemma (Jervis, 1978) and the Balance of Threat (Walt, 1985). Offense-defense theorists, primarily interested in explaining state behavior, developed on two main hypothesis: First, the Security Dilemma and the Balance of Threat are central concepts in order

to understand if states will go to war; second, the magnitude of the dilemma or imbalance of threat can be determine by the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities. For defensive realists the bottom line is that, despite the anarchical nature of the international system, states can find ways to defend themselves without threatening others. Thus, the possibility to maintain peace – on a relatively long term- is significant (Waltz, 1979; Glaser & Kauffmann, 1998; Van Evera, 1998). On the other hand, for offensive realists, because states are not only trying to survive but accumulate power, states always behave aggressively. The reasoning is as follows: in the absence of a superior authority states cannot be sure that today's peaceful conditions will be maintained tomorrow, consequently “self-help” is the only mean at their disposal to fulfill their goal and the more power they gain through any means necessary will make them more secure. Those elements lead us to locate offensive realism at the top of the map and consider defensive realism as a tendency of realist thinking that contemplate the possibility of precarious change. On the map, Van Evera and Glaser, two partisans of the offense-defense theory are situated in the middle of all realist tendencies.

LIBERALISM



Contrary to realists, liberal theories are characterized by their diversity, and consequently by their dispersion on the map. From theorists focused on the study of international society to those who center their attention on the individual, Liberals consider a multiplicity of analytical referents. Not only that, the methodology they use ranges from positivist to reflexivist, that is to say that some value the world as an object moved by material and independent forces and that others perceive it as something dependent of values and identities of each individual.

To differentiate between all of those I will be using Jackson and Sorensen taxonomy of Liberalism. In their book (2003, pp. 98-125) they establish a four category: interdependence liberalism, institutional liberalism, republican liberalism and sociological liberalism. Those categories allow us to distinguish between liberals who think that states can be dissuaded to

go to war because they rely economically on each other –interdependence liberalism –, liberals who consider that international institutions can mitigate the selfish tendencies in states' behavior, liberals who defend the idea that the democratic political regime can and in fact is leading to a minimization of the occurrence of the phenomenon of war and finally, liberals who argue that states are no longer the relevant analytical referent and that the attention of researchers has to be refocused on the individual as the motor of change.

On the map I have decided to add a fifth category -critical liberalism- and to represent the thinking of Woodrow Wilson and of John Ikenberry. In addition to those distinctions and following in Wendt's footsteps (1992, pp. 392-393), I propose to differentiate between a weak and a strong stream of liberalism.

Institutionalists (Rittberger and Mayer, 1993; Martin, 1998, 2012, 2013;

Simmons, 1998, 2013; and Young, 1999) are the liberals that are the most akin to realists. They build their argument on the same premises—rationality and utilitarianism. Their argument is that the structure of international society is determinant when we try to explain the behavior of states. If the structure of international relations is still anarchical, the central concept here is “normativity”. International institutions, using the legitimacy state gave them -or the autonomy they gained over time- to produce norms, are considered to be essential regulators of state behavior not anarchy *in se*.

Republican theorists (Maoz, 1993, 1996, 1999; Oneal, 1996, 1999, 2000; and Russett, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2000) taking on the basic premises of individual rationality, anarchical nature of international relations and materiality, prefer to develop their thinking using the state as the analytical referent. Contrary to neoclassical realists, republicans suppose that change in state’s behavior is primarily decided by the political regime under which they are organized.

Interdependence liberals (Rosecrance, 1986; Keohane, 1977; Mitran, 1948; and Hass, 1958) could be presented as strong liberals, that is, they break from the positivist canons in International Relations—centrality of state, as analytical referent and security, defined in military terms. State is not considered any more as the primary referent and the scope is

widened to other actors such as Multinationals and NGOs. Consequently, the concept of security is broadly defined and military defined security ceases to be the center of attention. Depending on the actor considered, issues such as economics, environment and culture can be put on the forefront of the research agenda.

Those three tendencies in liberal thinking are all characterized by the confidence their promoters have in the possibility of positive change. In other words, institutionalists, republicans and interdependentists all agree to say that a factor -norm, democracy or exchanges, respectively- has a positive effect on the path to progress and the establishment of “the common good”. Nevertheless, all of them point to the fact that this change can be neither profound nor speedy.

Critical (Richardson, 2001, 2002) and sociological liberals (Deutsch, 1966; and Keck and Sikkink, 1999) lead the researcher who chooses to follow their line of argument to use the individual as the primary analytical referent. With those two streams of thought the methodology changes. From positivist it passes, in some aspects, to reflexivist. Values and identities of actors start to be regarded as determinant factors in the qualification of reality. The main difference between the two streams is to be found in the grade of confidence authors have in the possibility of change. For critical liberals, in spite of the fact that they consider liberal values


as the seeds of universal progress, those very same values can be viewed as the substrate on which universal imperialism will blossom. Following this line of thought, critical liberals incite researchers to always bear in mind this possibility and to orient their reflection in a way that allows for the selection of the better means to attain real progress. Following the sociological trend of liberalism the researcher is led to take the individual as an intrinsic progressive agent. Contrary to critical liberals, sociological ones tend to view groups of individual, states and the international society as obstacles on the path to progress that the individual is trying to walk. To put it differently, individuals have to be freed from social contingences that constrain them in order to become the motor of progress they should be.

Wilsonianism and Ikenberry's proposal (2011) is characterized by the multiplicity of analytical referents considered simultaneously. International society and the state are viewed as equally important in the determination of the explanation of reality. In addition, for Wilsonianism,

groups of individuals are to be evaluated on the same basis because the free self-determination of nations is raised as a pillar of international peace and security. In Ikenberry's view the liberal order is conditioning state, group of individuals and individual behavior. At the same time this particular order is consolidated by state's, group of individuals' and individual behavior. In the first place, the liberal order was promoted by a hegemonic state (United States) but this order has taken such a form that no one—states, group of individuals or individual—would think to replace it and finally this lack of contestation toward the liberal order reinforces it.

Before taking on the English School, I would like to point out that authors such as James Rosenau and Robert Keohane are hard to place on the map because their work changed over time, considering the different analytical referents in different moments of time. The idea here would be to consider the groupings (realists, liberals, etc.) as clouds that are morphing depending on the author considered and the time in which they are writing.

ENGLISH SCHOOL



Members of the English School (ES) are engaged in methodological pluralism but they do not privilege a particular dimension of world politics. In their views “order” and “society” cannot be understood separately from geopolitical rivalries or cultural influences (Suganami and Linklater, 2006, p. 119).

Depending on the author considered, the ES can be close to the realist proposal (Wight, 1960, 1977; and Porter and Wight, 1996), the liberals (Vincent, 1974) or the constructivist approach (Wheeler, 2000). Nonetheless, all members of the ES have always insisted on the fact that the School had to be appreciated as a third way, between Hobbesian and Kantian perspectives. What ES members are arguing is

that rules/norms and institutions have the capacity to delay the inevitable moment of war and the destruction of state society as we know it. But for some of them –solidarists–, the current international society has, for the first time in History, the capacity to avoid going back to high degrees of violence and maybe mutate in a universal solidarity based order.

But the majority of ES members – pluralists- are extremely cautious about this prospect because the change of referent –from state to individuals- would imply considering cultural elements in the analysis and the construction of new patterns of behavior. If this were to be, the mutated society would have to be built on some common moral values in

order to promote justice and consequently maintain stability. But the matter of the fact is that, in a pluricultural world, the multiplicity of chances to wrongly choose those common moral values is such that this move could end up ruining any real possibility to attain that goal.

Some ES members are confident in the possibility of finding a common definition of what would be the “good life”. This definition should be rooted in the least common denominator: the “harm principle” or the virtue of political caution (Jackson, 2000).


The basic problem to which ES members try to find a solution is: How can it be that, in spite of the absence of a central authority in the world, a considerable grade of order exists in the relations of sovereign states? (Suganami, 2010, p. 23). The response ES members bring to this question is built on a broadly defined concept of international institutions. For them, institutions, particularly international law and diplomacy, are the ones that allow sovereign states to interact and communicate without to have to resort to violence. According to Bull, the system of

states created a set of norms and institutions that are able to maintain a certain degree of order between them, transforming the system in society.

The divide between pluralists and solidarists in the ES is not represented on the map but could be understood as the limit between those who have confidence in the fact that change could be profound or speedy and those who do not (on the map: superficial and precarious change or marginal and gradual change against profound or speedy change). Because the first ones think that there is no evidence that the world has attained the sufficient maturity to choose a set of common values in order to step away from the international society they are not confident in the possibility of change. The second ones think that in fact we –as a group of individuals but also individually- have reached this point and that change will be profound.

The consequence of this diversity is that ES members are located in broad space that range from positivism to reflexivism and from a low degree of confidence in the possibility of change and a high one.

CONSTRUCTIVISM



Constructivist approach to international relations presents itself as a “negative reflection” of liberalism on the reflexivist side of the map. All constructivists have a relatively strong confidence in the possibility of change. In fact, according to constructivist, change is the very characteristic of social world.

Authors like Keck and Sikkink (1999) could be located at the bottom of the map because their work on Human Rights, civil society and networks lead them to consider the individual as the primary analytical referent but also as the most important factor of change of the international normative framework and behavioral patterns of agents in global politics. But those authors, for being positivists and at the same time using sociological methods of investigation are situated at the crossroads between liberal theories and constructivist approaches. However, be-

cause they are most of the time identified as constructivists the choice was made to include them in the constructivist “cloud”.

Because Peter Katzenstein and his colleagues (1996) did choose to accentuate the importance of identity and changes of identity as the primary levers for behavioral modifications, we situated him in the vicinity of Margaret Keck and Kathrin Sikkink. Nonetheless, if we were to use the different categorizations of constructivist thinking (Hopf, 1998; Checkel, 2006; Reuss-Smit, 2005; Fierke, 2010; and Adler, 2013) in order to differentiate M. Keck and K. Sikkink from P. Katzenstein there would be no doubt on the fact that Katzenstein is more of an “orthodox” constructivist -or methodologically radical- than his counterparts. In fact Katzenstein is not only using qualitative methods in order to find and organize data but he is also trying to trace back the construction

process of identities in order to interpret behavioral changes.

Placing Emanuel Adler (1998, Adler & Barnett, 1998) on the map was done on the basis that his investigative interests are considered in function of the analytical referent “group of individuals”. In fact he is focusing his attention on the influence of identity on the definition of the concept of peace, the role of praxis in the conduct of world politics and the concept of Security Community (principally defined as a group phenomenon). The bottom line here is that Adler is evaluating the formation of identity processes in groups of individuals. It is true that based on his 1997 paper Adler could be identified as a conventional constructivist but reading carefully the conclusion he wrote (p. 330) we understand that if he admits the possibility to build bridges between positivism and reflexivism he does not cross that bridge. In his view the world is not uniquely and solely influenced by material forces.


Alexander Wendt (2006) focuses his attention on states, that is, international politics. This distinctive feature for a constructivist makes the positioning on the map difficult. If we were to break down his thinking conceptually speaking, we could argue that Wendt studies a particular grouping of individuals –the state- and a specific social structure –the norms and values created by states at the international level. It is for this reason that I placed A. Wendt at the crossroads

between those two analytical referents. His methodological obedience is less controversial. Because he tries to trace back the origins of the social learning process and because he postulates the determining influence of identity on the behavior of states, we made the choice to brand him as a reflexivist.

F. Kratochvill (1989) and N. Onuf (2012) study social structures. The former accentuate the role of norms, the latter the role of language on those structures. Both share the idea that change is inherent to social relations but that this change is limited in depth and speed. According to the former the possibility to see “revolutionary” norms institutionalized is limited because this would go against what agents are disposed to consider possible. According to the latter, in order for a change to occur it always needs to follow a long process of institutionalization.

Cynthia Weber and Maja Zeffhuss develop their argument using the humanity as a referent. Analyzing movie narratives, Weber is preoccupied with revealing the mental structure that condition the vision human beings have of the world (2008, 2011). Maja Zeffhuss is concerned with uncovering the abuses the world social structure produces. Currently her work on the relation of Ethics and War lead her to criticize the “Just War” concept (2012). For this very same reason, Zeffhuss could be best described more as a critical theorist than a constructivist.

CRITICAL APPROACHES



I will present Neomarxism and Critical theories in the same section. As Andrew Linklater masterfully argued (2005) Marxism and its different avatars can be viewed as essentially critical, but if we can see them as part of the same branch, they do not form a sole set of propositions.

Because Immanuel Wallerstein admits the possibility that a state can be relocated -or relocate itself- from the periphery to the semi periphery of the world system we can argue that he contemplates the possibility of change on the world stage. The

difficulty to locate Wallerstein on the map resides in the terminology he uses. Since he prefers the use of the word “system” over the word “structure” the question arises: shouldn’t he be located on the positivist side of the map? The response to this question can be formulated in those terms. Because Wallerstein’s proposal is rooted in Marxist thinking, the definition of the word “system” he uses is much closer to the one Marx gives of structure than the one Waltz gives to system. When Wallerstein considers the possibility of change

he does so thinking about the constraints produced by the global social structure, the local ones and the interests of the different groups involved in the decision making process. If change is possible, at best it will be marginal, never profound or quick.

Dependencia thinkers (Cardoso y Faletto, 1969; Faletto, 1980, Frank, 1979 and Amin, 1977) are also prone to consider the possibility of change. If possible, this change would require a rupture in the patterns of relations both at the local and global level. If one state were to change its relations with others it could have to modify its internal social structures and then find support on the international scale to transform the global social structure. Any attempt to do it alone would result, as the Mexican case demonstrated, in a consolidation of the structure.

Galtung's structural theory of violence (1969) was placed in the upper part of the map because this theory, in spite of its commitment to denounce injustices, implicitly states that change is impossible. States, group of individuals or individuals will always be submitted to the violence produced by social structures (local or global). Galtung states that the lesser social conditions of some is transmitted through time and that the social structures are resistant to change (1971, p.81). We could object that Galtung hopes and works for this change to happen and that in some particular cases this change happens. Nonetheless, the whole of the social structures will not be torn down by

single events. Furthermore I would argue that because suffering is a highly subjective variable, any social structure would be prone to create and reproduce the conditions in which some would perceive some kind of suffering. In fact social structures will always produce suffering, more easily so the invisible one.

If we are to consider Critical Theorists, Andrew Linklater was placed on the bottom part of the map because he demonstrated in his books (1900a, 1990b, 1998) that, first, in his point of view change is inherent to social interactions and, second, that this change have been profound and quick in the last hundred years. More so, Linklater tries to identify the margins that could facilitate a more coherent change in our daily lives—margin situated between discourse and practice.

Sometimes identified as a constructivist James Der Derian is an atypical author that we choose to designate as a critical theorist. With methodologically close ties to the postmodern Foucault and to the poststructuralist movement, Der Derian focuses his attention on the relations between social structures, lobby and industrial groups, and the worldview they produce and perpetuate (2009). Still, Der Derian never stops to try to find alternative ways in order to promote global peace and security (Constantinou & Der Derian, 2010).

As a consequence of their highly critical posture Robert Cox and Richard Ashley are much less confident in the possibility of change than Der Derian

and Linklater. Ashley notably wrote that anyone who follows the narrative of modernity is condemned to reproduce its false promises (1987, p. 492). For Ashley, power is a part of discursive practices, or our way to think, act, and the way we define ourselves. In his view, all discourses are the vehicle of oppressive pretensions (1988). Discourse is the first and most efficient tool to discipline and punish (Foucault, 1975). If some discourses are construed to liberate (feminism, resistance of the South, environmentalists) they will eventually produce new exclusions and sufferings (matriarchy, Hegemony of the South or green intransigence). In this context Robert Cox could be placed in between Der Derian and Ashley because if he tries to denounce suffering and structural abuses he still relies on his interpretation of History and the influence of social structure when he analyses human relations. In 2010 he predicted that the world stage could change in two ways: first, we could go back to a multipolar Balance of Power or, second, we could go back to a full-scale struggle for power. This prediction shows he is not confident in the possibility of positive change – at least in the short term.

SOME MISSING ELEMENTS


Not all of the theories of International Relations are represented on this map. This has more to do with the lack of time and the lack of sufficient knowledge, than the design of the map in itself. Feminism

and non-western theories are some of those missing approaches that I intend to include on it at a further point. I nonetheless feel confident that the map would not need any modification in order to do so.

One major concern could come from the fact that some theorists are trying to build bridges between theories. Doing so, it could be argued that the map would become useless. But even if those bridges can –and in fact should– be built, this would not affect the pertinence of mapping. In fact, remembering the definition of what is the theoretical pluralism could help. Some authors (Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Hall, 2003; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006; Sil and Katzenstein, 2008, 2010a, 2010b; Lake, 2011; and Checkel, 2013) were listing a series of common elements of definition of “bridging”. The first and most important feature of this common definition is that bridging is not about building an alternative paradigm. In that view there is no need to place on the map theoretical thinking that is based on the will to build bridges between theories because they are not to be considered as theories.

Finally, I would like to insist on the fact that this map is first and foremost designed as a pedagogical tool for beginner students of International Relations. Its primary objective is to clarify the differences and similarities between the main theoretical approaches. In that sense the particular location of one author can always be discussed and modified depending on what particular feature of ‘their’ or ‘his’ or ‘her’ thinking is considered.

AN INCLUSIVE MAP OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND AUTHORS



<input type="radio"/>	Defensive realist	<input type="radio"/>	Liberals	<input type="radio"/>	Constructivism
<input type="radio"/>	Offensive realist	<input type="radio"/>	English school	<input type="radio"/>	Neorealism
<input type="radio"/>	Neorealism	<input type="radio"/>	Neobosnia realism	<input type="radio"/>	Critical theories
					Presidential authors

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